Beyond Bush II: American Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

The inauguration of Barack Obama as the first African American president of the United States is scheduled for January 20, 2009, a date that will stand as a watershed in American history. Like Canada, which appointed Michaelle Jean, a woman of colour, and of Haitian origin, as the Governor General in 2005, the United States is moving into a new era in which it will redefine its self-image and its political identity. A nation born of the anti-colonial struggle in the Americas against the European powers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the United States was soon followed by Haiti, and later, by the Spanish colonies on the American mainland.

At the moment of its creation, the United States was in the vanguard of the Revolutionary era which shattered the control of the European imperial states in the New World. However, even as it served as a catalyst for the anti-colonial struggle during that era, the United States was deeply ambivalent about the creation of an independent Haiti by way of a revolution led by free people of colour and slaves determined to shed their shackles.

Given the American commitment to the maintenance of slavery in the American Republic, Haiti was both a repudiation of the American commitment to slavery and an uncomfortable reminder of other possibilities for people of color in the Americas. Further, given the centrality of Protestant Christianity in the shaping of the American self-image as a refuge from the iniquities of Roman Catholicism in Europe, the shrinkage of the French and Spanish imperial presence in the Americas was a reassurance that European power in the Americas was in retreat. However, the Roman Catholic presence in these societies, as well as the language differences did little to stimulate a shared sense of history or identity between the United States and these former colonies of the Catholic empires even though they had all been part of a broader struggle to end European imperial rule in the Americas.

Over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the emergence of the United States as an expansionist and imperial power in its own right helped to exacerbate the sense of intrinsic difference between the American experience and that of its hemispheric neighbours. As part of its expansionist vision, American leaders from President James Monroe - the champion of the Monroe Doctrine warning against the expansion of European influence in the Americas - to the present, embraced the idea that America was the "natural" leader of the hemisphere and have sought to limit the autonomy of the other American states by using a variety of strategies including military intervention, economic leverage, and subversion against governments deemed a "threat" to American security.

In effect, American exceptionalism in the context of American relations with other states in the Western Hemisphere has been rooted in its transformation from a former colony of Britain into a colonial power in its own right- both within the Americas and at the level of the wider international system. It is the only state in the Americas which has pursued an explicit imperialist agenda following the model of the European imperial states and which has repudiated its roots in the anti-colonial struggle against the European powers of yore. It has also evolved into a counter-revolutionary power which has shown itself consistently opposed to the emergence of revolutionary regimes in the international system - another clear break with its own origins in the 18^th century era of Atlantic Revolutions.

The election of Barack Obama to the US Presidency has demonstrated the American willingness to rise above its long history of denying citizenship rights to its black population which was central to its creation in 1787. Obama's election, in effect, provided further evidence of the American ability to redefine itself over the course of its history-from oligarchy based upon the votes of the propertied classes and the practice of slavery to popular democracy based upon universal human suffrage; from revolutionary regime to counter-revolutionary state; from anti-colonial champion to imperial power; and from white supremacist regime to multi-cultural democracy.

However, Obama will be facing the task of redefining American foreign policy priorities in an era shaped by the strategic and military blunders, the financial profligacy, and a profound crisis of credibility in American leadership across the international system triggered by the Bush administration. He will also be confronted by the need to redefine the American policies towards revolutionary regimes which emerged over the latter half of the 20th century - the Chinese Revolution of 1949, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

For his predecessors, these regimes have been a major constraint upon American efforts to consolidate and/or extend its influence in the non-European world. In effect, Obama will be called upon to reposition American foreign policy in dealing with societies that have been the targets of American imperial strategies and which have, as revolutionary regimes, challenged American influence in the "world of color."

Thus, as part of the broader redefinition of American foreign policy strategy after the misadventures of the Bush administration, the Obama administration will have to rethink the reflexive American hostility to revolutionary regimes that have survived American efforts to isolate and overthrow them. In the case of China which embarked upon a strategy of industrial modernization over the past three decades that has now transformed it into the industrial workshop of the world and a key player in the World Trade Organization, the restructuring of the international political economy and the future of the international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank cannot be effective without an enlarged role for China.

As the largest investor in American securities and with the largest foreign reserves in the world, China's financial weight will be a critical determinant of the limits of American influence in the international financial institutions and, ultimately, in the role and value of the dollar as a currency in international trade and payments. In effect, China, by dint of its enormous productive capacity and its foreign reserves has become an indispensable partner in the Bretton Woods system that has underpinned American economic leadership of the world economy since 1945. In the context of the current global economic crisis and the evidence of failed American leadership under the Bush administration, China is in a position to play an increasingly important role in restructuring the international economy and the rules of the game therein.

On the other hand, the United States is confronting the challenge posed by the paralysis of its financial and industrial sectors that followed the cumulative unraveling of the domestic mortgage market, the liquidity crisis within the banking sector, and the threat of financial collapse of the automobile industry over the course of 2007 and 2008. The severity of these economic shocks had already focused the attention of the incoming Obama administration upon the need for serious economic reform at home. However, the recent arrest of Bernard Madoff for his role in creating, perhaps, the biggest investment swindle in the history of Wall Street - while the Securities and Exchange Commission charged with overseeing the financial services industry was asleep at the wheel - has provoked further questioning of the capacity and competence of the American government to provide a safe and stable environment for foreign investment.

The Bush II era opened with the collapse of the energy trading company, ENRON, amidst evidence of widespread financial irregularities and it is now closing with the saga of Madoff at the epicenter of what appears to be a global swindle which has ensnared investors. In effect, both Wall Street and the American government's regulatory regime have shown themselves to be inept, at best; without serious reform, foreign direct and indirect investment in the United States may be adversely affected. The lack of American credibility that has defined life under the Bush administration remains a serious constraint upon American efforts to exercise leadership at an international level. In this context, the necessity for deeper strategic engagement with China and other major players has become critical to America's standing in the wider world and to its own domestic economic well-being. Such strategic engagement implies that the American resort to unilateralist policies will be severely constrained and that there will be a fundamental reorientation of American foreign policies as it comes to terms with the realities of the limits of its influence around the world.

China, for its part, has been systematically pursuing a strategy of increasing its international influence by diplomatic and commercial means rather than through the projection of military power that has defined American policy. The Chinese strategy has proven to be very effective in redefining the context within which American foreign policy is pursued. In the case of the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program, China has shown a willingness to pursue the resolution of international tensions within a multilateral framework and the Bush administration has been constrained to follow suit. The European Union has demonstrated its willingness to serve as a mediator between the United States and Russia following the Georgia-Russia conflict in mid-2008, and it has become increasingly active in breaking the logjam that has resulted from the Bush administration's diplomatic failures in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, Germany, France, Britain, Turkey, Russia and China will play an increasingly important role in the broader Middle East and the creation of new security architecture in the region.

The Bush administration's policies, including the invasion of Iraq, have brought an end to American strategic pre-eminence in the Middle East and any new regional security arrangements, including the issue of the development of nuclear power, will be shaped within a multilateral framework in which China will play an influential role. In effect, the acceptance of a multilateral approach to the management of the international system will be central to American efforts to rise above the legacies of the Bush II administration. The American approach to the Afghan imbroglio - given the resurgence of the Taliban within that country, and the growing evidence that an Afghan settlement will require the participation of China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia - will also lead to a fundamental reorientation of American policy away from its focus under the Bush administration upon the containment of Russia and China through the projection of military force into the region.

In the case of Cuba, Fidel Castro's decision to resign as President of Cuba, passing the torch to his brother, Raul, has opened the way for a restructuring of Cuban-American relations. America's use of the Guantanamo prison/naval base on Cuban soil has inflicted serious damage upon America's image in the wider world, and the closure of the prison camp will also be a factor in any new era in Cuban-American relations. The closure of the prison camp will signal an American willingness to abide by international norms and treaties that have governed the detention and treatment of prisoners of war. It is not inconceivable that the return of the base to Cuba - as part of broader negotiations over the normalization of US-Cuban relations - could be used to signal that the United States is prepared to turn the page of America's relationship with the Latin American states by respecting their sovereignty. Just as important, an end to the American economic blockade of Cuba onward will create a new context in which the United States can engage with other states in the region.

The Latin American states are increasingly looking at the explosive growth of the Asian economies for new opportunities to limit their dependence upon the United States which has shaped the region's development for most of the 20^th century. These states are looking to follow the Cuban government strategy since the 1960s of using its ties with the Soviet Union, Europe, and, more recently, China to circumvent American efforts to limit the ability of Latin American states to diversify their economic and political relations with the wider world. Cuba was determined to assert its sovereignty after the overthrow of the Batista regime in order to bring an end to the quasi-colonial relationship with the United States which had defined its existence since 1898. A new era in Cuban-American relations will end the illogic of a continuing Cold War in the Caribbean and create an opportunity for US-Latin American relations to be restructured beyond the shadow of American imperialism in the region.

Finally, the American relationship with Iran stands at the heart of its relations with the Middle East and the wider Islamic world, with its NATO partners, with its emerging strategic relationship with India, and with China and the USSR. In 1953, the United States and the United Kingdom mounted a successful covert intervention to restore Reza Pahlavi to the throne in Iran. That intervention opened the way for greater American involvement in Iran's politics and its support for the autocratic regime of the Shah that was eventually overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The overthrow of the Shah, following upon the oil crisis of 1973-74 which arose out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, marked a serious reversal for American influence in the region. Like the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, the new Iranian regime after 1979 was determined to pursue a policy that made the country independent of the United States - a policy that has continued to the present day.

The Iranians have pursued a larger role in the politics of Islam and have actively sought to ensure that the country's weight in the region should not be discounted by other regional actors like Israel and Saudi Arabia. Its strategy of building its military power and its cultivation of closer relations with Russia and China has provided it with room to enhance its autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Its support for Syria, for the Palestinian national movement, and for Hezbollah in Lebanon has allowed Iran to become a major influence upon the Arab states and that strategy has also allowed it to maintain pressure upon Israel - the main American ally in the region.

In the three decades since 1979, the Iranian quest for greater regional and international influence has made it an increasingly assertive participant in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and a key strategic partner for both Russia and China in both the politics of energy and as a source of leverage for these states in dealing with American efforts to establish an exclusive zone of influence in the region. The Iranian quest of mastery of nuclear energy, with support from Russia through the construction of a nuclear power station, has also raised the spectre of Iran of joining the nuclear club and becoming a major threat to Israel - the only other Middle Eastern state widely acknowledged to be a nuclear power. Thus, Iran's geopolitical importance, its influence as a major producer of both petroleum and natural gas, its growing military and technological capabilities, and its strategic entente with China and Russia have made it a key factor in the security of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the Caspian and Central Asia, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

For the United States - trapped by unintended consequences of its two-front war in Iraq and Afghanistan - coming to terms with the reality of Iran will provide the diplomatic space to rethink the folly of the "War on Terror" pursued by the Bush administration. It will also allow the United States to become a constructive participant in the multilateral efforts to reshape the security environment in the Middle East and South Asia. The failure to engage Iran effectively since the success of the 1979 revolution has been damaging for American foreign policy - in both regional and global terms.

The effort to compensate for that failure by (1) backing the Saddam Hussein regime under the Reagan administration; (2) establishing military bases in Saudi Arabia in the Bush I and Clinton years; and, (3) occupying Iraq under Bush II; have all failed to reverse the decline of American influence. The American hostility to the Iranian Revolution since 1979 has expanded into an estrangement between the United States and the Islamic world - with consequences that are becoming increasingly global in scope. The recent assault on the Indian city of Mumbai by Islamic militants, and the deliberate targeting of areas frequented by Westerners and a Jewish center in the city, cannot be divorced from the growing strategic entanglement between India and the United States - and the perception that India, with a population of over 100 million Muslims, has been willing to follow the Bush administration in its "War on Terror".

The Obama administration has an opportunity to recast American foreign policy by coming to terms with the reality that the Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian revolutions have redefined the terms of American engagement with the non-European world. It would be a tragedy for American foreign policy if the Obama administration were to follow in the footsteps of its predecessors in failing to come to terms with revolutions in the non-European world after 1945. The American embrace of imperialism as a competitor and successor of the European imperial states over the course of the 20^th century discounted its own history as a product of the anti-colonial struggle. It has also led to imperial policies that have failed in Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and, more recently, in Georgia - a less than inspiring record that needs no duplication.

First published in The Trinidad and Tobago Review January 12, 2009