Côte d'Ivoire: Revisiting the Past, Forecasting the Future By Bertin Kouadio

When Professor Zeleza first introduced this site to me, I got so excited to write often, as the Obama era was unfolding right before our eyes. Then, I got so consumed by my new teaching and administrative duties, as the new chair of the international studies at my institution. This was a serious challenge for me as I was freshly coming out of graduate school with no prior knowledge of such things as: Departmental Assessment Plan, Students Learning Objectives and Outcomes, Course Rotation, Adjunct Hiring, Various Academic Committees, Budget Management, and so forth...

The other challenge was the very nature of my institution, which was all female (or College for Women), and located in the heart of Pennsylvania. After a year of hard and serious learning, I have decided to return to this discussion forum, which I value very much. I have been reading almost all the postings, but I felt that something was missing in the daily discussion: the Côte d'Ivoire Conundrum.

Therefore, I thought I should initiate the discussion in order to get the views from all of the brilliant minds on this site. My first posting may seem a nostalgic piece, but it hopes to set the stage for future discussions. It is more or less a summary of what used to be Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouet-Boigny. Then what changed, how, and why?

Generally speaking, Côte d'Ivoire is worth discussing in depth for a number of reasons. In the local context the current political crisis has weakened/destroyed most of the aspects of Ivoirian life. It has brought more poverty, fear, suspicion, frustration, moral deviances of all sorts, and even hatred. In the larger context the current political crisis has had a direct consequence on the neighboring countries, West African states, and relations with the former colonial power (France). More importantly, an instable Côte d'Ivoire is a great concern for the whole Mano Region, where it seems there has been a gradual return to relative peace and normalcy after a long period of turmoil.

For academics like myself, Côte d'Ivoire is an interesting case because it was stable for a long period of time, which made it an infertile ground for conflict. Until 1990, this small West African state of  20,617,068 million (2009 estimates) was dominated by a single-party system led by President Felix Houphouêt-Boigny. A combination of internal and external factors had forced the late president and the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), to adopt multiparty democracy in 1990. Thereafter, the country experienced political tumult and then civil war.

Côte d'Ivoire is also an interesting case for comparative purposes due the fact that several states in West Africa (for instance, Benin, Togo, and Ghana) had experienced military coups but did not have civil wars. This begs the question: why did Côte d'Ivoire, which was relatively stable under President Houphouêt-Boigny, suddenly begin to experience political violence in the 1990s and an explosion in 2002? 

This essay discusses the relative economic success and political stability under Houphouet-Boigny (1960-1993). Part two will examine the events immediately following Houphouet-Boigny's death until the outbreak of the current civil war (1993-2002), while part three will focus on the resolution the crisis, and prospects for Côte d'Ivoire (2002---).

Part One: The Long Period of Relative Stability

The period (1960-1980) was marked by significant progress in the economic sector and national unity, which led some analysts to (quickly) describe Côte d'Ivoire as an exception in Sub-Saharan Africa. Côte d'Ivoire, not only was regarded as the mirror of West and Francophone Africa, but also a symbol and model of political and economic success on the continent, and the developing world (as suggested by several analysts). President Houphouêt-Boigny, who ruled this country nearly for four decades (1960-1993), was considered the main architect of that success and stability due to the fact that he was able to hold the various ethnic and religious communities together. As a result of this, several labels were attributed to that country, including: "oasis of prosperity and stability", "economic miracle", "the lung of West Africa", "heavy weight", economic "locomotive" of West Africa, "African elephant", and "Success Story."

It should be emphasized that, under President Houphouêt-Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire was a key player on the world stage both politically and economically, especially on the African continent. As Nyong'o (1978 and 1987) writes, economically, he created an African capitalist model for his country that generated a huge success in the first two decades of independence, as well as massive West African immigrant communities into Côte d'Ivoire. A large number of people of Lebanese descent, French, and North Africans settled in Côte d'Ivoire also (Gottlieb and Kouadio 1997).

Politically, the man to whom Siriex (1975 and 1986) dedicated two books (Houphouêt-Boigny: L'homme de la Paix, or The Man of Peace, and Houphouêt-Boigny Ou la Sagesse Africaine, or The African Wise Man) was very active both inside and outside his country. At the continental level for instance, he assisted in the resolution of many crises including; the Biafra war of 1970 in Nigeria, in Angola and Mozambique, in the 1990s civil war in Liberia, and so forth. Furthermore, he granted asylum to many deposed ex-African leaders, and he remained the main leader of the famous France-Afrique on the continent up until his death, which involves the whole Francophone Africa. Because of his political longevity and respect by his peers, he was considered by many the father and source of wisdom for the young generations of African leaders. Finally, he was involved (at least the political side of it) in the dismantling of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, which he barely saw the undoing.

But, Houphouêt-Boigny's legacy has been more ambivalent among scholars, politicians, and especially the people of Côte d'Ivoire. Among the people of Côte d'Ivoire for example, any explanations of the past largely reflect people's party and ethnic affiliations. This was perceptible among educated and non-educated, Akan and non-Akan, as well as the old and young people.

It should be noted that Côte d'Ivoire has been run mainly by Baoulé (or Baule), Bété, and Dioula (or Dyula) leaders, yet also reveals a postcolonial interest by the French. Félix Houphouêt-Boigny, a Baoulé from Yamoussoukro (center), was its first president, and he remained in that position until his death on 7 December 1993 at the age of eighty-eight. There is a large consensus between scholars that the life of the president and the history of the country were so close, so intertwined, that it appears almost impossible to separate the two. In fact, Jacques Baulin (1980 and 1982), a former advisor to the president, called him "Monsieur Côte d'Ivoire." In other words, one could not talk of Côte d'Ivoire without referring to Houphouêt-Boigny, and vice-versa. Moreover, it was an indication of the tight control the president had over his country and people. But, where did the president derive all this power, and how did he manage to remain so close to his people and country?

Houphouêt-Boigny's initial rise to power started during the colonial era when he served as an African physician (médécin Africain) in various regions of the country, including Aboisso (south-east) and Guiglo (west). Then, as the head of his family, and traditional chief of his native Akouè tribe (center) after his maternal uncle Kouassi Ngoh died. Some years earlier, he had studied medicine in the prestigious colonial school of William Ponty at Gorée, Senegal.

It was French colonial Governor Lapalude of Côte d'Ivoire who invited the young physician to take over the position of his deceased uncle, a loyal chief to the French colonial administration. He was then forced to resign from his position to take over not only the destiny of his family, but also that of his native tribe, as well as serve the interests of the colonial administration.

Houphouêt-Boigny was set to become a wealthy man, and to have an illustrious, bright, and long political career. He inherited a huge amount of wealth from his family and the colonial administration, which he later used during his political struggle against his opponents. Among other things, he claimed all the cocoa, coffee, and tobacco plantations, as well as assets from both his deceased brother (Augustin Dia) and his uncle Kouassi Ngoh. Quickly, the former African physician became a wealthy man and a big African planter.

Throughout his career, Houphouêt-Boigny was a fine politician who was able of combining intelligence and cleverness, courage and risk taking, confidence and hope, by navigating sharply between traditional and modern ways of governance. Admirers such as former associate Mamadou Coulibaly and University Professor Semi Bi Zan among others, referred to him as the most prominent politician of his time in Sub-Saharan Africa. They described him as clever, smart, opportunistic, very energetic, and his political career filled with important achievements. But, Houphouêt-Boigny was also identified with the anti-colonial movement through the African Democratic Rally (RDA), a regional association of which the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) was a local chapter. His education and other responsibilities had earned him a good deal of respect.

In 1930, he married his first wife, a royal Agni descendent (east) with a Senegalese father. Thus, he acquired kinship ties with another Akan group (the most important ethnic group in the country), and with the foreign African community. In 1940, he organized the Association of Customary Chiefs (Associations des Chefs Coutumiers), thus extending his influence among traditional leaders throughout Côte d'Ivoire. He also expanded his influence to intellectuals, where he had more detractors and opponents. In 1944, he also organized the African cocoa and coffee growers (Syndicat Agricole Africain) in Côte d'Ivoire. Hence, he joined together large numbers of people from various ethnic groups who relied upon him for representation. These activities reflected his ability to create a wide network of popular and political support, Mundt (1987) writes.

Mundt also observes that, in Côte d'Ivoire, the politics of independence began after World War II, focusing on local elections in Abidjan, then balloting to send representatives to the Constituent Assembly in Paris. That, political activity began in the trade unions, ethnic and other associations in the towns, and in a farmers association. A coalition of these organizations sent Houphouêt-Boigny to the Constituent Assembly in Paris. According to Amondji, while in France, he succeeded in lobbying for and obtaining the abolition of forced labor, which gave him the undisputed prominence among the Ivoirian electorate. He then came home to participate in the formation of the PDCI, drawing support from the union of African planters and other groups.

In 1946, Côte d'Ivoire and other territories joined with France in the French Union, giving him another opportunity to excel among his peers. The same month saw the birth of the RDA, a regional party encompassing all of Francophone Africa with affiliated groups in each colony (Worster 1989). By 1950, not only Houphouêt-Boigny emerged as the undisputed leader of the PDCI, but also to the colonial administration the obvious choice as spokesman for the country and its move towards independence in 1960 (Mundt 1987).

In 1956, he was successively named mayor of Abidjan, and he entered the French government at the ministerial level (Legum 1965). After a negotiated deal with France, he became Côte d'Ivoire's first president on 7 August 1960. He was re-elected again and again without any real opposition in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 (Lye 2003).

During his tenure as president, Houphouêt-Boigny played key roles as an educated leader, a modern politician, and traditional chief. This navigation of identities ensured his position locally, regionally, and worldwide. More importantly, he realized an important dream; put his tribe in the command of Côte d'Ivoire. In so doing, he intentionally manipulated the Constitution to ensure his successor and the continuing influence of the Baoulé people demonstrated by the smooth transition to Bédié's rule upon his death (Bakary 1984, Wauthier 1997, and Wiseman 1995).

On the one hand, admirers such as Xavier (1971), Baulin (1980 and 1982), Zan (1986), Siriex (1975 and 1986), and Coulibaly (1975), attributed the long period of stability to Houphouêt-Boigny'skillful political maneuver, open-door and immigration policy towards his neighbors during the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s, and the strong ties to the West, especially France.

On the other hand, his major critics such as Gbagbo (1980 and 1983), Kourouma (1970 and 1978) denounced the president's repressive tactics against his political enemies. It is worth noting that both Gbagbo and Kourouma had been imprisoned by the late president for their hash criticisms against the absence of democracy during the single-party regime. During those years, Houhouphet-Boigny' supporters portrayed Gbagbo as ‘rude', and someone who dared to challenge the authority of the ‘old'and autocratic president. In the end, Gbagbo and Kourouma exiled to France, where Kourouma died a few years ago.

It should be noted that the country had experienced several painful events in the past with dramatic consequences under Houphouet's watch. These included the Guébié rebellion of 1969-70 in which entire Bété villages were wiped out by the army in Gagnoa region (center-west, and also Gbagbo's native region), the deaths of known and vocal political opponents such as Ernest Boka, Biaka Boda, Kragbé Gnagbé, who were brutally suppressed, or had lost their lives under very strange circumstances, student activists who were enrolled by force in the military and sent to a notorious camp in Séguéla as punishment for the rebellious action toward the regime, and the numerous alleged plots (faux complots) used to attack his opponents. In some instances, some of these political enemies or suspected troublemakers were named Ambassadors to far away countries. This was the case of Army General Bertin Zézé Barouan, a Bété from the west, who was named Ambassador to Brazil without any formal training in foreign affairs.

Cohen (1974) had also documented the riots of Ivoirian against foreign nationals (mainly from Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Togo, Ghana, and Dahomey (now Benin)) in the 1970s. According to him, these people were accused of taking jobs from Ivoirian citizens in various sectors of the economy, including teaching and petty trade. That these foreigners were called on to leave, their shops were burned, their street stalls wrecked, and in fact, the government of Houphouêt-Boigny commanded them to go, thus giving Ivoirian nationals satisfaction. These were clear signs that the first regime was not that peaceful. The main difference with the subsequent regimes was that it was able to control quickly and retain national unity somewhat.

Despite all this, it is undeniable that Côte d'Ivoire's impressive economic success and political stability during the early years of independence was owed to the vision Houphouêt-Boigny had for that country. As Rothchild et al. (1996) have argued for, he believed in a unified, stable and modern state built on a solid base of agricultural export. This was translated by an open-door policy throughout the region, which attracted foreign migrant workers in the cocoa and coffee plantations owned first by the local planters. Gradually, some of these migrant workers were able to purchase some portion of the land and grow their own cocoa and coffee, and thus some of them settled permanently. This led Côte d'Ivoire to become the world largest producer of cocoa, and occupied a high rank in coffee production as well.

Unfortunately, this relative economic prosperity of the early years of independence could not be sustained, due to some internal and external forces described below. As Toungara (1986) writes, the country was in need of political reform and economic change. The so-called economic ‘miracle' was now being tarnished (Bourke, 1987), and the ideology of development in place was heavily been challenged (Young 1982 and Rapley 1993).

The local state newspaper Fraternité Matin (2003) also acknowledged this fact. According to this newspaper, between 1980 and 1990, the fall of the price of cocoa and coffee occasioned a fatal downfall of the Côte d'Ivoire's economy. This newspaper also adds that the sectors of the economy were hardly hit, especially the agricultural sector. As a result of this, many people could no longer afford to send their children to school, and buy basic goods, including medicine. Moreover, the habits and lifestyles of the people changed drastically creating anger, frustration, and general misery among the majority the population. Expectedly, this had put enormous pressure on the government both internally and externally. Inside the country, the number of the discontents grew rampant, while in the outside there were lots of pressure from the foreign debtors, including the IMF and World Bank.

On 25 May 1987, the government announced it could no longer pay its external debt, which was estimated at 6 billion U.S. dollars, forcing it to accept and implement some painful policy prescriptions (also known as structural adjustment programs) imposed by the foreign donors led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

This resulted in a significant increase in unemployment, which was already high due to the closing of many factories. Moreover, the government proposed to reduce the salaries of the workers in the same year knowing the fact that in Sub-Saharan Africa the government is the major employer, and also that one civil servant feeds more than his or her own nuclear family (husband, wife, and children). It was clear that cutting the salaries would have dramatic consequences. Expectedly, these measures provoked huge social protests in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country, forcing the government to review its first round of adjustment measures. It tried without success to find new ways that would be less painful. Each time it met the opposition of the people.

Meanwhile, the opposition led by Laurent Gbagbo began pushing for multiparty democracy and the organization of transparent and fair elections in the same year (Conteh-Morgan 1997). During these difficult moments, President Houphouêt-Boigny was caught between the demands from the foreign aid donors on the one hand, and the social organizations and political opposition on the other hand. But, the government had to take courageous decisions to save the country from plunging further (Fraternité Matin 2003).

It was in this context that the president called upon Allasane Dramane Ouattara (also called ADO), a former Governor of the West African Central Bank in Dakar (BCEAO), who was serving as Deputy-Director of the African Division at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington D.C., to inject some shocks into the Ivoirian economy (Konaté, 2004).

In April 1990, Ouattara led the Comité Interministériel de Coordination du Programme de Stabilization et de Rélance Economique to oversea the adjustment program. On 7 November 1990, he was named Prime Minister, the first in Côte d'Ivoire's history. However, the honeymoon between the new Prime Minister and the people did not last long. Rumors about his identity were being circulated around the country. According to Fraternité Matin (2003), it was alleged that the former Deputy-Director of the IMF in Washington D.C. (1984-1988) had worked with a Burkina-Faso passport. As a result, this made him a non-Ivoirian or alien to this country. But, nobody could voice this officially and loudly enough as Houphouêt-Boigny, although physically diminished, was still dominating the political machine in Côte d'Ivoire.

Ouattara went ahead anyways and designed a number of important, but unpopular measures that is to follow. The same newspaper argues that the first set of measures included; reduce the number of government vehicles per ministry, force the wealthy barons of the old regime and private sector to pay back taxes or dues accumulated over the years (especially telephone, water, electricity, personal property), suppress the gratuity of university buses that used to be free for all the students, and privatize both government owned and semi-owned companies.

Unfortunately, this first round of austerity measures did not yield the expected results for the government's coffer remained empty. Ouattara added new measures to the list. For example, he decided to reduce the salaries of all the new teachers for all the levels of the education system by 50%. This decision gave birth to the famous phrase: "same job-different salary?" (à travail égal-différent salaire?). Next, he introduced for the first time the controversial Alien Identification Card (Cartes de Séjour), whereby every national from the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) or (CEDEAO in French) was required to pay 5,000 F CFA (7.6 Euros) per year, while other immigrants outside this organization must pay 50,000 F CFA (76.2 Euros) annually, as a resident alien (Fraternité Matin 2003).

At that point, it was clear that these structural adjustment measures had set the stage for mounting social unrest throughout Côte d'Ivoire. This also meant that the situation and established system were also going to blow anytime. Between 1990 and 1991, the country experienced huge mass protests and strikes by students, police, customs officers, University professors, transport workers, professional associations, and this climaxed by the takeover of the airport by army conscripts in 1990 well documented by Akindès (2000) and Kieffer (2000), while Cogneau (2003), Toungara (1999), and Bratton and van de Walle (1997) wrote extensively on the social implications of these adjustments in the country and elsewhere on the continent. As one scholar puts it, all of these protests were a direct response to the appalling and poor economic diet imposed on the country by the IMF and the World Bank.

For a while, Ouattara and his drastic measures became the center of all the daily conversations throughout the country, especially in Abidjan. Those barons who were summoned to pay back taxes disliked him very much. In the end, these structural adjustment measures, which were intended to improve the economy in the first place, incidentally brought significant changes into Côte d'Ivoire. For instance, they gave the average Ivoirian the opportunity to break certain taboos of the past including; defying the authority of the government, speaking freely and publicly about local politics, and most importantly speaking against the autocratic President Houphouêt-Boigny, something which was unthinkable before.

It was pretty clear even in 1990 that Côte d'Ivoire would face many challenges ahead, both economically and politically, but no one knew the exact extend of it. Economically, although there were some improvements, the majority of the people remained unhappy with the government that continued to struggle with its foreign financiers (mainly the IMF and World Bank). Konaté (2004) argues that, politically, tension grew greater and greater among the people, especially with the entering of Ouattara onto the Ivoirian political space. Meanwhile, the hailing president's health started to deteriorate at a French hospital in Paris. Rumors of his death spread quickly all over the country. Finally, on 7 December 1993, Houphouet-Boigny was officially pronounced dead during a nationally televised address read by former Prime Minister Ouattara. (Part two to be continued...)

Bertin Kouadio is Assiustant Professor of International Studies and Chair of International Studies, Wilson College, Pennsylvania.